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INTRODUCTION
The briefs of the Respondents/Appellees make no new
arguments about the propriety of the Order of the Public Service
Commission ("Commission") subject to this appeal.

The Commission

sua sponte purported to bifurcate the issues before it into two
cases, i.e., (1) whether the sale of White City Water Company
("White City') to Sandy City ("Sandy") is in the public interest
and should be approved (which retained the original docketing No.
91-018-01);

and

(2)

whether

the

Commission

would

retain

jurisdiction to regulate rates of non-Sandy customers after the
sale (which was assigned a new docketing No. 91-018-02) . The issue
whether the sale is in the public interest, docket No. 91-018-01,
remains before the Commission.
Sandy

and

White

City

In order to resolve this issue,

requested

the

Commission

to

schedule

proceeding concerning the sale.1 Appellants ask the Court to take
notice of the proceedings to the extent they bear on issues
relevant to this appeal.

1

Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Appellants respectfully
request that this Court take judicial notice of the proceedings currently in progress before
the Commission with respect to White City's application. This court may take judicial
notice of proceedings having a direct relation to a matter before it Wohlschlegel v.
Uhlmann-Kihei, Inc., 662 P.2d 505, 508 n.l (Haw. Ct. App. 1983); Holguin v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 918, 920 n.l (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
Pursuant to Rule 201(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, in separate Appendix,
Appellants have supplied the Court with the testimony filed in the proceedings necessary
for the Court to take judicial notice of these proceedings.
47453
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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
1.

On January

27, 1993, the

Commission

issued

a

scheduling order in the Application of White City which states that
"the Commission

is willing

to consider alternatives

to full

jurisdiction that will protect the interests of retail water
customers outside municipal boundaries and still allow the sale of
White City to proceed."

The order directs White City and Sandy to

"file testimony, exhibits and work papers, including any cost-ofservice studies, supporting their position that the sale would
benefit the public interest and a clear explanation of why it
cannot afford us any intelligence on resolving the non-residents'
concerns without going through the public interest portion of the
hearing." Order of the Public Service Commission dated January 27,
1993, Appendix Tab A at p.2.
2.

Sandy and White City filed testimony and exhibits in

support of its contention that it is in the public interest to
approve the sale of the stock of White City to the Building
Authority.

The testimony and esxhibits filed by Sandy and White

City support the following propositions:

(a) that among Sandy's

reasons for acquiring White City is provision of a safe, stable
water system for present and future residents (Testimony of Darrell
Scow, Director of Public Works for Sandy City, before the Public
Service Commission, Appendix Tab B at p. 3 ) ; (b) that Sandy is in
the best position to provide such a water system (Scow Testimony,
id. at pp. 3-4) ; (c) that current rates for non-resident water
users are cost derived (Scow Testimony, id. at pp. 6-7; Siegel
47453
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Study attached at Tab B, number 3); (d) that non-resident water
users are proportionally represented on the Sandy City Water board
(Scow Testimony, id. at p. 8); and (e) that Sandy can make needed
capital improvements to White City at less cost to its users (Scow
Testimony

of

Steven R. McFarland

before

the

Public

Service

Commission, Appendix Tab C at pp. 7-8).

ARGUMENT
I.
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER IS NOT A FINAL ORDER
The Commission's Order, which is the subject of this
appeal, deals only with the issue of whether the Commission would
retain jurisdiction to regulate rates if the sale between White
City Water Company and the Sandy City Municipal Building Authority
is approved.

The Commission did not take evidence or conduct a

hearing concerning whether approval of the sale would be in the
public interest.

Instead, after briefing by the parties on the

issue of jurisdiction, the Commission purported to severe the
jurisdictional issue from the case by assigning it a different
docketing number.

The Commission announced its decision on the

jurisdiction issue and declared that the order was a final order.
A.

ISSUES IN THIS CASE REMAIN UNRESOLVED BEFORE THE
COMMISSION.

It is axiomatic that, for purposes of appeal, a final
order ends litigation and leaves no claim remaining for resolution.
Tippets v. Page Petroleum, Inc.. 738 P.2d 635 (Utah 1987). Parties
are entitled to only one appeal as a matter of right and only after
47453
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entry of final judgment that concludes the action.

Pate v.

Marathon Steel Co., 292 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984) . In this instance the
Commission has not addressed the central issue of approving the
sale of White City.

It has decided only a condition to the

contract of sale# i.e.# the jurisdiction of the Commission.

The

query here is whether bifurcating issues in a case makes an order
regarding one issue a final order for purposes of appeal.
Appellees have not addressed the clear ruling set out in
Public Utilities Commission v. Poudre Valley Rural Elec. Ass'n. 173
Col. 364, 366, 480 P.2d 106

(Colo. 1970) holding that simply

assigning separate docket numbers does not make separate cases. In
Poudre

Valley,

the

court

stated

that

"unless

and

until

an

administrative matter is reduced to a final judgment, settling all
the issues between the parties, we will not review it.

The

assignment of separate numbers by the Commission to its decisions
dealing with different phases of the same proceeding did not create
two separate proceedings." Id. at 108. In the Poudre Valley case,
the Public Utilities Commission argued that one decision made by
the Commission was final and should have been appealed before a
second decision was entered.

The Court dismissed this reasoning

stating that the first order wcis an interlocutory, rather than a
final order, as it was "merely a part of the continuing litigation
on this problem."

Id. None of the appellees address the ruling in

Poudre Valley or give separate authority supporting the notion that
a commission can make an order final by assigning a new docket
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number to it.

Clearly, the Commission's Order lacks finality and

should be dismissed.
Furthermore,

when

other

issues

remain

below,

the

appellate court allows review only under the standards set out in
the Rules of Civil or Appellate Procedure.

Neither the standards

set out in Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor the
granting of a petition under Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, have been satisfied in this instance.

The appellees

argue that "the Commission made a final, appealable decision on the
issue of jurisdiction to regulate Sandy.11

Joint Brief, at 25. No

authority or discussion supports this assertion.

Similarly, Salt

Lake County argues that the Commission's Order is final because
"the Commission assigned a separate docket number (91-018-0-02) to
that portion of its order declaring it has jurisdiction over
Sandy's sale of water to non-residents."

Salt Lake County Brief,

at 22. None of the appellees explain why issues remaining before
the Commission relating to the sale of White City to Sandy are not
integral to the jurisdictional issue.

Further, the appellees do

not explain how an order can be final where issues between the
parties in the litigation remain before the Commission.
in Sloan v. Board of Review.

As noted

781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 463) "an

order of [an] agency is not final so long as it reserves something
to the agency for further decision."

Sloan. 781 P.2d at 464.

The current proceedings before the Commission concerning
approval of White City's application may resolve some of the
Commission's concerns about future regulation and may require the
47453
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Commission to revise assumptions on which it based the Order.
Among these assumptions are Sandy's reasons for acquiring White
City, whether a higher rate for non-Sandy users is justified on a
cost

basis,

and

improvements.

whether

White

City

could

finance

needed

The Commission implicitly relied on assumptions

about those issues when it executed its Order.

However, there is

no factual basis for those assumptions and the Commission is
currently hearing evidence to resolve those issues.
even

the

fact

that

the

Commission

is

now

Certainly,

taking

underscores the lack of finality in this matter.

evidence

All of the

reasons for lack of finality set out in Kennecott Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Utah 1991), apply in this
instance and the matter should be remanded to the Commission for
all issues to be determined.
In sum, the Commission has not created, and cannot
create, two separate matters in this case.

The initial issue of

White City's application remains before the Commission.

Thus,

until the issue of approval of the Agreement between Appellants is
resolved, the Commission's Order regarding jurisdiction is not a
final order.
B.

UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT (#UAPA") DOES
NOT PROVIDE STANDARDS FOR PINAL ORDERS.
Appellees are correct in arguing that the Commission

is governed by the provisions of UAPA when conducting hearings and
other administrative proceedings. UAPA, however, does not include
a provision that creates a standard for determining whether an
order from the Commission is final or non-final. Statutes and case
47453
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law determine finality.

For example, in Sloan v. Board of Review,

the Utah Court of Appeals stated that

w

[CL] n appeal can be taken

only from entry of a final judgment which wholly disposes of a
claim against a party."

Id. at 464

(internal quotation and

citation omitted) .2 Where claims remain, the decision is not final
for purposes of appeal.
C.

THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUING A FINAL
ORDER HAVE NOT BEEN SATISFIED

Salt Lake County argues that the Commission's Order is
final because the Commission complied with Utah Admin. R. 750-10011(C).3

County Brief at 23.

The County also argues that the

Commission's Order is final because Section 54-7-10(1) of the Utah
Code provides that orders of the Commission "shall take effect and
become operative on the date issued."

County Brief at 23.

The

arguments fail because neither statute provides standard by which
a court may determine whether an order is final or non-final.
D.

THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS IRRELEVANT TO
A DETERMINATION OF THE FINALITY OF THE COMMISSION'S
ORDER AND, EVEN ASSUMING THAT IT IS RELEVANT, THE

2

Salt Lake County contends that "[t]he holding of Sloan is distinguishable under
the facts of the present case . . . ." SLC Brief, at 24. Petitioners disagree with Salt Lake
County's contention. Regardless of whether the ultimate holding of Sloan is factually
distinguishable from the instant case, however, it is clear that the finality standard applied
in Sloan is the appropriate standard to be applied in judicial review of orders from
administrative agencies.
3

Utah Admin. R. 746-100-ll(C) provides as follows:
If a case has been heard by the full Commission, it shall confer following the
hearing. Upon reaching its decision, the Commission shall draft or direct the
drafting of a report and order, as provided above, which upon signature at
least two Commissioners, shall become the order of the Commission.
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APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS CASE IS DE
NOVO REVIEW
Appellees argue that the appropriate standard of review
in this case is the "whole record" or "substantial evidence"
standard of review under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-b-16(4)(g) (1989 &
Supp. 1992).4
or

hear

However, the Commission refused to accept evidence

testimony

concerning

the

application

before

it.

Accordingly, the Commission's decision involves an interpretation
of its statutory powers and authority which is a question of law,
not a question of fact as argued by Appellees.
Industrial Comm'n. 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Bevans v.
See also

MCI v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 186 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1992) (questions
of law are reviewable under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)). In
MCI, this Court made it clear that issues reviewable under Section
63-46b-16(4) (d) are subject to de novo review. MCI. 186 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 10.
Furthermore, this Court, as well as the Utah Court of
Appeals, has repeatedly held that appellate courts reviewing agency
determinations involving questions of law under Section 63-46b4

This provision states, in pertinent part:
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the c o u r t . . . .

47453
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8(1) (d) are to give no deference to the agency's decision. Ouestar
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 817 P.2d 316 (Utah 1991);
Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991);
Savage Indus.. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 811 P.2d 664 (Utah
1991) .

Thus, Appellees' contention that de novo review is not

appropriate in this case is without merit.
II.
THE COMMISSION'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
CONSTITUTES A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND A VIOLATION OF
THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT
The Commission acted improperly by bifurcating the issue
of jurisdiction from the approval of White City's Application
because the Commission does not have the power to make decisions
sua sponte on issues not raised by the parties. In Chevron v. Utah
State Tax Commission, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Ct. App., January
29, 1993), the Court of Appeals agreed with Chevron that it was
"improper for the Commission sua sponte to raise and decide an
issue that had not been raised by the parties."

Id. at 24. The

Court cited Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc.. 680 P. 2d 733
(Utah 1984) which states "a trial court has no authority to render
a decision on issues not presented for determination."
736.

Combe at

Here the Commission had no authority sua sponte to bifurcate

the issues in White City's application when bifurcation was not
requested by any party and the issue was not addressed by any
party.

47453

Sandy and White City were taken by surprise when the

9

Commission determined to take this novel route. Clearly, adequate
notice and an opportunity to object to the process were missing.
In addition, under the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-0.5 to 63-46b-22 (1989 & Supp. 1992),
the Commission must follow certain procedures in conducting formal
adjudicative proceedings.
administrative

hearings

Section 63-46b-8 provides that in all5
associated

with

formal

adjudicative

proceedings, n[t]he presiding officer shall afford to all parties
the opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct crossexamination, and submit rebuttal evidence.

Id. at § 63-46b-

8(1) (d) .
The Commission's Order was issued without holding an
evidentiary hearing despite objections by White City and Sandy.
Indeed, before a hearing was held on the approval of the Agreement
between Sandy and White City and the jurisdictional question raised
by this agreement, the Commission had already drafted the Order at
issue and informed the parties that it would retain jurisdiction if
the agreement were approved. Although the Commission informed the
parties that they could attempt to change the Commission's mind
through oral argument, the Commission did not allow the parties to
present any evidence.
Salt Lake County attempts to rationalize and legitimize
the Commission's denial of the parties' rights to due process, and
5

Section 63-46b-8(l) states that the procedures outlined in the rest of Section
8 apply to all formal adjudicative proceedings except as provided in Subsection 63-46b3(d)(i)
and (ii). The exceptions enumerated in Sections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii) do not apply to the
instant case.
47453
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the Commission's violation of UAPA# by cLrguing that a factual
hearing was not necessary because the record contains sufficient
uncontroverted facts to support the Commission's decision. County
Brief at 20. Similarly, the Commission and White City Water Users
attempt to legalize the Commission's actions by noting that the
Commission's decision was based upon legal and factual evidence, in
the form of legal memoranda and briefs, received from all parties.
Joint Brief, at 22.

In this regard, Salt Lake County asks this

Court to interpret Bunnell v. Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331,
1333

(Utah 1987)

(every person who brings a claim before an

administrative agency has a due process right to a fair trial) and
R.W. Jones Trucking. Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 649 P.2d 628
(Utah 1982) (due process includes notice and opportunity to be
heard and defend) as holding that every person who brings a claim
before an administrative agency has a due process right to receive
a fair trial, including notice and an opportunity to be heard,
unless the administrative agency independently determines that a
fair trial and due process are not necessary.

Or more absurdly,

that if the Commission determines, in its discretion, that a
hearing is not necessary in light of the legal memoranda, documentation and briefs filed by the parties, it need not be held.
However, this Court used absolute language in Bunnell,
guaranteeing that individuals appearing before the Commission hold
the right to due process without any exceptions.

This rule is

reiterated in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23, 28
(Utah Ct. App. 1991)
47453

(it is clear abuse of discretion for an
11

administrative body to conduct proceedings in a way to deny due
process).

Furthermore, the Utah legislature clearly expressed its

intent that the Commission's adherence to UAPA be mandatory, and
not discretionary, by stating that n[t]he presiding officer shall
afford to all parties" the rights outlined in Section 8. Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-8(l) (d) (1989) . The Utah Court of Appeals recognized
the mandatory nature of UAPA in D.B. v. Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing. 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), in
which the Court held that the plaintiff social worker's due process
rights were violated by an administrative law judge who failed to
provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to cross-examine an
adversarial witness at a hearing concerning revocation of the
plaintiff's license to practice.
In sum, the Commission must comply with the Constitutional mandates of due process and the requirements of UAPA in all
situations except those specifically enumerated by the courts and
the legislature, none which are relevant in this case.

In the

instant case, notice and an evidentiary hearing would have allowed
the parties to present facts and evidence demonstrating that
approval of the proposed transaction would be in the public
interest.

More importantly, an evidentiary hearing would have

given the Commission, and this Court, the factual basis on which to
determine the constitutionality of the Commission's exercise of
jurisdiction.

Thus, notwithstanding Appellees' arguments to the

contrary, the Commission's refusal to allow an evidentiary hearing
violated the parties' rights to due process and violated the
47453
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provisions of UAPA, all to the substantial prejudice of Appellants.
Consequently, Appellants are entitled

to the judicial relief

requested in this appeal.

III.
THE COMMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER MUNICIPAL WATER SALES.
The

issue before

this Court

is the extent of the

Commission's jurisdiction over sales of water by a municipality.
Specifically, the Appellants challenge the Commission's conclusion
that it "would retain jurisdiction to regulate rates charged the
extra-territorial retail customers . . . "
Order, pg. 15.

Commission Report and

The Appellees have avoided the straightforward

analysis applicable

to that narrow question.6

Instead, the

Appellees have argued "facts" of their own making, supposedly
supported by a record devoid of any evidence and the policy reasons

6

The citations to White River Shale Oil v. Public Service Commission, 700 P.2d 1088
(Utah 1985) and Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 682 P.2d 858 (Utah
1984) in the Joint Brief do not support the Commission's extension of jurisdiction because
jurisdiction was not an issue in either case. Similarly, City of Orangeburg v. Moss, 204
S.E.2d 377 (S.C. 1974), does not support extension of the Commission's power because the
case does not deal explicitly with a "ripper" clause exception and because, in that case, the
Commission had statutory authority to regulate.
Respondents' citation to North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation
Company, 223 P.2d 577 (Utah 1950), for the proposition that continuing regulation by the
Commission is an "obligation" that would remain with White City after its sale to Sandy is
similarly inapposite. County Brief at 19; Joint Brief at 10. In North Salt Lake the court
found that while the town took the water company with binding obhgations (to serve certain
customers) from prior Commission orders, the obhgations did not include continuing
regulation by the Public Utilities Commission.
47453
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why the commission's jurisdiction should be allowed based on those
hypothetical facts.

Policy hyperbole, however, cannot substitute

for a lack of statutory jurisdiction. Hypothetical facts cannot be
the basis for disregarding the constitutional protection accorded
municipalities against interference by special commissions under
the West Jordan balancing test, even assuming it applies, since
that case certainly requires a full evidentiary hearing in order to
balance the interests.
A.

ONLY A FACTUAL HEARING CAN DETERMINE WHETHER
SANDY'S SERVICE OF WATER TO NON-RESIDENT WHITE CITY
USERS IS SALE OF SURPLUS WATER AND INCIDENT TO
SERVICE TO SANDY'S RESIDENTS.

Case law has consistently held that the Commission may
not regulate cities selling water to non-residents.

In Salt Lake

County vs. Salt Lake City. 570 P.2d. 119 (Utah 1977), the County
asked

this

Court

for

a

declaratory

order

that

the

City's

distribution system was so extensive it should be deemed to be in
the business of selling water and, therefore, subject to regulation
by the Commission. Utah's Supreme Court clearly recognized that a
city's

"business

in

furnishing

water

to

its

residents

and

activities reasonably incident thereto, is not subject to regulation by the Commission."

Id. at 121-122. In dicta following this

holding, the court noted that the extent to which "a city may
engage in rendering a utility service outside city limits without
being

subject

determined."

to
Id.

some

public

This

regulation

is not

so

dicta, however, does not

clearly
give the

Commission authority to retain jurisdiction in this case. At most,
Salt Lake County directs the Commission to conduct evidentiary
47453
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hearings to determine the extent of surplus sales, not to establish
jurisdiction.
Here Appellees' argument that Scindy's sale of water to
current White City water users would constitute a general business
rather than being incidental to furnishing water to its residents
has no factual support.

The Commission's Order states that among

the "salient considerations" are its "doubts that service outside
the city boundaries would constitute exercise of a municipal
function."

The Order also states the Commission's "skepticism

that Sandy would be selling surplus water."

Commission Report and

Order at p. 4, emphasis added. However, nowhere does the Order set
out even a scintilla of evidence that the prospective sale is not
incident to Sandy's service to its own customers or any criteria to
determine what is "surplus" water.
Similarly, Appellees assert, without legal or factual
support, that the sale of water by Sandy to non-resident White City
water users would not be "surplus" water because the sale would be
to already existing customers. Appellees further argue that if the
water was "surplus" Sandy would not be obligated or required to
sell such water for the long term and, therefore, the water users
would have no guarantee of continued future service.

These

arguments do not address the legal issue of whether the Commission
has authority to regulate.
Meanwhile, White City and Sandy are in the process of
setting forth facts before the Commission concerning the sale of
White City to Sandy.
47453
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sale of water to non-residential users is incidental to Sandy's
water delivery system, that such sale is of surplus water, and that
proposed rates are reasonable in light of costs.

Only after the

Commission has had the opportunity to evaluate the testimony and
studies presented to it, will the issue whether sale of water is
incident to Sandy's municipal functions have some factual basis and
this court have a record to review.
B.

SANDY'S SALE OF WATER TO NON-RESIDENT WHITE CITY
USERS IS A LOCAL MATTER CONSTITUTING A MUNICIPAL
FUNCTION.

Appellees rely on City of West Jordan v. Utah State
Retirement Board. 767 P.2d. 530 (Utah 1988), and Utah Associated
Municipal Power Systems v. Commission of Utah, ("UAMPS") 789 P.2d.
298 (Utah 1990) to argue that the Commission should have jurisdiction over Sandy's delivery of water outside its boundaries. It is
not clear that the analysis set out in those cases applies to water
utilities.

This Court has twice been asked to rule that cities

selling water to non-residents should be regulated by the Commission.

In County Water System, Inc. v. Salt Lake City. 3 Utah 2d

46, 278 P.2d 285 (1954) and Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570
P.2d

1191

(Utah 1977), this Court clearly stated that cities

selling surplus water outside their boundaries are not regulated by
the Commission.

However, even if the analysis set out in City of

West Jordan and UAMPS applies in this instance, the Commission did
not apply the balancing test announced in these cases.

In UAMPS.

a number of municipalities planned to establish an electrical
system to supply electricity over a large territory.
47453
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Under § 11-

13-27, Utah Code Ann., such a system must apply for and receive a
certificate of convenience and necessity from the Commission. The
Commission, after extensive hearings, found that the system would
have duplicated existing lines and generated excess electricity.
The Supreme Court, noting that the electrical system extended far
beyond any single city, held that the proposed electrical system
went beyond any municipal function and, therefore, the statute
granting jurisdiction to the Commission to regulate such a system
would be constitutional.
this instance.

No such balancing test was ever done in

The appellees simply conclude, without analysis,

that "the sale of water to non-residents involves more of a state
regulatory

interest

than an exclusive

local interest and is

sufficient to avoid the characterization of a municipal function."
County Brief at 18.

Such a conclusory statement, based on no

factual analysis, and in light of the close alignment of Sandy's
and White City's water systems demonstrates

the Commission's

failure to apply even a minimal UAMPS analysis.

Clearly, the

Commission cannot simultaneously deny White City and Sandy the
opportunity to put on evidence and rely on the fact-intensive
analysis required by City of West Jordan and UAMPS.

The Order

should be dismissed and the matter remanded to the Commission for
findings.
CONCLUSION
Salt Lake County, the Commission and White City Water
Users ask this Court to affirm an Order that is not final, that
violates the basic standards of due process, and that is in direct
47453
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contravention to existing constitutional, statutory and case law.
In contrast, White City and Sandy ask the Court to overrule the
Order and to remand the matter to the Commission.

White City and

Sandy ask the Court to direct the Commission to resolve all the
issues before it and to give White City and Sandy an opportunity to
present their evidence to make an appropriate record.
1
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63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative
,*i i? P r o c e c d i n R » — Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i)
and (n), m all formal adjudicative proceedings, a
hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of
relevant facte and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a
party, the presiding officer.
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious;
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in
the courts of Utah;
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in
the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or
excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the
original document;
(iv) may take official notice of any facte
that could be judicially noticed under the
Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of
other proceedings before the agency, and of
technical or scientific facte within the
agency's specialized knowledge.
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay.
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue,
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit
rebuttal evidence.
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not
a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at
the hearing.
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if
offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the
agency's expense.
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a
person approved by the agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions
that the agency is permitted by statute to impose
to protect confidential information disclosed at
the hearing.
d) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary to
preserve the integrity of the heanng.
1988

63-46b-l& Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is unconstitu.
tional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro.
cedure or decision-making process, or has failed
to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
dii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 1968

